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CASE SUMMARIES

ASTAIRE v. BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.

116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997)
INTRODUCTION

Robyn Astaire ("Mrs. Astaire"), the widow of legendary
performer Fred Astaire, brought suit against Best Film & Video
Corp. ("Best") alleging that Best's use of her late husband's image
in dance instructional videotapes violated her statutory right to
control such use under California law.1 Mrs. Astaire claimed that
when her husband died in 1987, she succeeded to all rights in his
name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness and persona pursuant
to California Civil Code § 990.' Though the United States District
Court for the Central District of California concluded that Best did
not use Astaire's image for the purpose of advertising, selling or
soliciting the sale of the videotapes, summary judgment was
ultimately granted for Mrs. Astaire. Both sides appealed and the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The appellate court
concluded that Best's use of Astaire's image was exempt from
liability under Cal. Civ. Code § 990.?
FACTS

In 1965, Fred Astaire and the Ronby Corporation ("Ronby")
entered into an agreement which allowed Ronby, through an
exclusive license, to use Astaire's name in connection with dance
1. Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp., 116 F.3d 1297, 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. Id. at 1299.
3. Id.by
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studios, schools and related activities.4 Ronby also obtained the
right to use pictures, photographs and likenesses of Astaire which
had been used pursuant to a previous agreement. In addition,
Ronby was permitted to use any photographs and likenesses that
Astaire approved in writing.'
In 1989, Best and Ronby entered into an agreement to make a
collection of instructional dance videotapes using the Fred Astaire
Dance Studios name and licenses.'
Thereafter, Best began
manufacturing and distributing the "Fred Astaire Dance Series,"
consisting of five videotapes, each containing about thirty minutes
of instruction in a particular type of dancing.7
The beginning of each videotape starts with the same
introductory segment First, Best's logo appears on the screen,
followed by the title "Fred Astaire Dance Studios Presents How to
Dance Series."9 About ninety seconds of footage from two of
Astaire's movies, Second Chorus and Royal Wedding, follow. The
footage shows Astaire dancing."
Still photographs of Astaire
appear next, followed by a narrator who, on a stage decorated with
more Astaire photos, introduces the series and the instructional
portion of the video.
In 1989, Mrs. Astaire sued Best in district court, alleging that
Best's videotapes violated her § 990 rights when it used Astaire's
image from the movie clips without her permission." The district
court's holding included the following legal determinations: (1)
Best's use of the Astaire film clips was covered by the language of
§ 990; (2) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not a use for
"advertising, selling, or soliciting" in violation of § 990(a); (3)
Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under § 990(n);
(4) Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim was not preempted by the federal
4. Id. at 1299.
5.Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1299.
6.Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Astaire, 116F.3dat 1299.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/7
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Copyright Act; and (5) Best's use of Astaire's likeness was not
protected by the First Amendment. 3 The sole issue on appeal was
whether Mrs. Astaire had a § 990 claim against Best.
LEGAL ANALYSIS

At the outset of its analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated that, even
though this case involved an issue of state law, it would review the
district court's decision using the de novo standard for decisions of
federal law. 4 Furthermore, since this was a question of California
law, the reviewing court was obligated to decide the case as it
believed the California Supreme Court would. 5 If there is no
California Supreme Court decision, the Ninth Circuit must try to
"predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue
using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other
jurisdictions, statutes, treatises and restatements as guidance." 6
Best argued that the district court erroneously concluded that its
use of the Astaire film clips violated the "on or in products,
merchandise or goods" prong of the statute. 7 In addition, Best
contended that the district court erred in concluding that subsection
(n) of § 990 did not exempt its use of the Astaire film clips. Mrs.
Astaire, on the other hand, contended that the lower court should
have concluded that Best's use of the film clips violated the
"advertising, selling, or soliciting" prong of subsection (a).' The
Ninth Circuit decided to address Best's subsection (n) argument
first since a finding of complete exemption from § 990 liability
would render examination of the other issues unnecessary."

13. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1300.
14. Id. See also, Mastro v. Witt, 39 F.3d 328, 241, (9th Cir. 1994).
15. Id. See also, Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d
1551, 1556 (9th Cir. 1991).
16. Id. See also, Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537,
1545 (9th Cir. 1996).
17. Astaire. 116 F.3d at 1300.

18. Id.
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In consulting California law on statutory interpretation, the
Ninth Circuit found that the initial object is to ascertain the
legislature's intent in order to effectuate the purpose of the law.20
This procedure requires a court to first examine the words of the
statute and give them their ordinary meaning. In doing this, a court
must not only interpret the language in context, but also remain
Any statutory sections
mindful of the statutory purpose."
containing language on the same subject must be harmonized both
internally and with each other to the fullest possible extent.
Having stated these principles, the Ninth Circuit turned its
attention to the language of this particular statute to begin it
application. Section 990(n) provides:
(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased
personality's
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of
instances:
the following
(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical
composition, film,
radio or television program, other than an
advertisement or commercial
announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).
(2) Material that is of a political or newsworthy value.
(3) Single and original works of fine art.
(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement
for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).2
Giving the language in this provision its ordinary meaning
would seem to yield clear examples of what uses are exempt from
§ 990 liability. When taking § 990 as a whole, however, exempted
use becomes much less clear. Subsection (n)(1) specifically limits
the exemption to the uses listed therein, but also states that "such
uses are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial
announcements." 3 This limitation is further qualified, however,
20. Id. See, Quintaro v. Mercury Cas. Co., 906 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1995)..
21. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1300.
22. Cal.Civ.Code § 990(n) (West 1997).
23. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/7
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because such advertisements or commercial announcements may
still be exempt under subsection (n)(4). This is possible because
subsection (n)(4) exempts advertisements and commercial
announcements for the uses described in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2)
and (n)(3).2" Therefore, in order to determine whether a use is
exempt under subsection (n)(1), one must refer to subsection
(n)(4), which in turn refers back to subsections (n)(1), (n)(2) and
(n)(3).
The Ninth Circuit, recognizing this "convoluted statutory
scheme," 26 offer three examples to help clarify what these
provisions mean.27 In the first example, the court hypothesized
about a person who uses a deceased personality's name without
authorization when writing a magazine article about the history of
television.2 ' Both the writer and the publisher would be exempt
from § 990 liability because of subsection (n)(1). 29 The second
example supposed an automobile manufacturer who wanted to
advertise its newest model in a magazine with a colorful design
which included a picture of a deceased personality.3" Though the
use involved is in a magazine like in example one, it would not be
exempt under subsection (n)(1) because the deceased personality's
photo appears in the advertisement.31 Since this use would not be
permitted under subsections (n)(1), (n)(2) or (n)(3), it cannot be
exempt under subsection (n)(4).32 The final example used the
publisher from example one who now wants to advertise the
magazine by referring to articles that had appeared in its pages,
including the article about the history of cinema.33 If this particular
advertisement used a deceased personality's name, the use would

24. Id.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301.
32. Id.
Published
33. Id.by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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be exempt under subsection (n)(4) because the advertisement was
34
for a magazine, which is permitted under subsection (n)(1).
Best used the Astaire film clips on pre-recorded videotapes,
which is not specifically listed in subsection (n)(1), although films
and television programs are mentioned.35
Normally, when
statutory language is clear, examining the legislative history is
unnecessary. On the other hand, the court stated that "'[i]t is a
settled rule of statutory interpretation that language of a statute
should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in
absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' 6 To
interpret subsection (n)(1) as exempting a film or television
program but not a videotape is indeed an absurd result. It would be
nonsensical to think that the legislature intended a motion picture
to be exempt from § 990 liability when it is shown in a theater or
on cable television but not when someone rents or purchases it
from a store and plays it on his VCR.37 Furthermore, the court felt
that this absurd result would be inconsistent with § 990(i) because
it contains a broad definition of "photograph" which includes
photographic reproductions, whether still or moving, of videotapes
or television transmissions where the deceased personality can be
easily identified. Because it would have been anomalous to
conclude that the definition of the word "photograph" included a
videotape recording of a film but the word "film" did not, the Ninth
Circuit believed that the California Supreme Court would not have
followed the literal language of subsection (n)(1). Therefore, the
court held that the term "film" in subsection (n)(1) included Best'
pre-recorded videotapes.
Having reached this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that
its analysis was not complete because, as example two above
illustrated, a particular use may not be exempt even though it is
listed in the first part of subsection (n)(1). A use that is listed in
the first part of subsection (n)(1) will not be exempt if it is an
advertisement or commercial announcement that is not exempt
34. Id.
35. Astaire, 116F.3dat 1301.
36. Id. (quoting Younger v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1014, 1021-2 (1978)).
37. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1301.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/7
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under subsection (n)(4).3"
The court, however, found it
unnecessary to resolve the parties' dispute over whether the use of
the film clips was an advertisement or commercial announcement
because Best would be exempt from liability in either case.39
The court reasoned that if Best's use of the film clips was not an
advertisement or commercial announcement, then the second part
of subsection (n)(1) would not apply and the use would be exempt
under that subsection.40 Even assuming arguendo, that Best's use
of the clips is considered an advertisement or commercial
announcement, that use is still exempt. 4' This is because it would
be an ad or announcement for the purpose of the videotapes as
opposed to some other product. 42 The court referenced the third
example above, which illustrates how subsection (n)(4) exempts
ads and commercial announcements for uses allowed under
subsections (n)(1), (n)(2) and (n)(3). 43 Since the court held that the
videos were exempt under the first part of subsection (n)(1),
subsection (n)(4) provides that "even if Best's use of the Astaire
film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, such a
4
use is exempt from liability."
Mrs. Astaire's erroneous argument ignored the last five words of
subsection (n)(1) (referencing subsection (n)(4)) and focused on
the fact that because the use was an ad or commercial
announcement it could not be exempt even if the tapes were
included under subsection (n)(1). 4' The court, noting that each part
of a statute must be given significance, could not disregard this
language. Hence, it held that the only logical reading of subsection
(n)(4) is that it exempts ads and announcements "for the uses
4
permitted by the preceding three subsections., 1

38. Id. at 1302.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Astaire, 116 F.3dat 1302.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1302.
46. Id.
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The court concluded that, when read as a whole, subsection (n)'s
proper and only meaning leads to the conclusion that Best's use of
the Astaire film clips is exempt.47 However, the court's inquiry did
not end here because it was obligated under California law to
decide if the meaning of the plain language could be reconciled
with the legislature's intent.
Senate Bill 613 (:SB 613") is the legislation which enacted §
990. Mrs. Astaire claimed that the legislative history of SB 613
supported the district court's holding that subsection (n)(1) created
a limited exception for "legitimate historical, fictional, and
Mrs. Astaire
biographical accounts of deceased celebrities."4
making the
at
aimed
was
film
clips
the
use
of
that
Best's
argued
videos more attractive and salable and, therefore, could not be
exempt under subsection (n)(l). 49
In making this argument, Mrs. Astaire relied on several letters
written by the author of SB 613. The Ninth Circuit, however,
could not examine these letters because California law contains a
general prohibition against considering the motives of individual
legislators even if that person wrote the statute.
The court is permitted to make an evaluation of things such as
the legislative history of the statute, committee reports, and staff
bill reports in order to determine the intent of the legislature. In
addition, courts may follow a statute's evolution through the
California State Senate or Assembly because this process may
contain significant information regarding legislative intent.
In its original form, SB 613 did not contain § 990. The Senate
passed the bill in this form, but the Assembly amended it many
times."0 When § 990(n) first appeared in the amended legislation
on June 12, 1984, it read:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
derogate from any rights protected by constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the
press, such as the right to use a deceased
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1302.
50. Id. at 1303.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/7
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personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, film,
television program, or similar medium of
expression, to the extent the use is protected by the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or
freedom of the press."
After a staff report criticized this version of the bill, § 990 was
put in its existing form containing no explicit language "limiting
the scope of its exemption to constitutionally protected uses." 2
The court put significant emphasis on the Legislature's deletion
of the language "to the extent the use is protected by the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the
press" from SB 613. The court felt that this omission was crucial
because it "demonstrated an intent to adopt a broader exemption
that was not limited to constitutionally protected uses."5 3 Based on
this evolution of subsection (n), the court held that its view of the
statute, as required by its plain language, was consistent with the
Legislature's intent.5 4
A group of several staff reports, including the one mentioned
above, described SB 613 as being created with the intention of
addressing situations where exploitation of a celebrities name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness leads to commercial gain,
or the celebrity is abused or ridiculed through a marketed product."5
Examples of such uses given in the reports were posters, T-shirts,
porcelain plates, and other collectibles, toys, gadgets, merchandise
and look-alike services.5 6 The court stated that Best's use neither

51. S.B. 613, 1983-4 Reg. Sess. (Cal.1984)(hereinafter "S.B. 613") (as
amended June 12, 1984).
52. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1303. See also, Staff of Assembly Comm. on
Judiciary, 1983-4 Reg. Sess., Report on SB 613 (Campbell) As amended
6/12/84 at 6 (Cal. 1984).
53. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1303.
54. Id.
55. Id. See Staff of Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, supra, at 3-4; See also,
Assembly Office of Research, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., Report on S.B. 613
(Campbell) As Amended 8/9/84 at 3 (Cal. 1984).
Published
by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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the
abused or ridiculed Fred Astaire, nor did it 5resemble
7
exploitative marketing uses listed in the staff reports.
The court was well aware that Best's motives for placing the
Astaire clips in the videos was increased marketability.s However,
there was no support in the statute or the legislative history that
would permit the court to make a legal distinction between Best's
use of the clips and their use in a documentary about dance in film.
Even Mrs. Astaire conceded that use in such a documentary would
be exempt from liability. Hence, the court concluded that Mrs.
Astaire's claim for a limited exception to be drawn from subsection
(n) was not born out by the legislative history. 9
DISSENTING OPINION

The dissent focused its attack on the fact that Best did not use
the Astaire film clips in the actual dance instruction videos.6
Although the dissent agreed that subsection (n)(1) exempts
videotapes even though the statute does not expressly refer to
them, it felt that the majority went too far in holding the clips
exempt as an ad or announcement of an exempt use.61
The dissent argued that the majority focused improper attention
on subsection (n)(4) when holding the use exempt, while the actual
source for the exemption should have come from subsection (n)(1),
which allows use of an image or likeness in a videotape and the
like. 62 However, the dissent found it impossible to give an
exemption here because the Astaire footage was never used in the
dance instruction videos.63 While the clips of Astaire were used to
promote the dance video, Astaire's image never appeared during
the instructional part of the tape.' The dissent argued that if Best
Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1303.
Id.
Id. at 1304.
Id.
61. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1304.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss2/7
57.
58.
59.
60.
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had used the clips in an advertisement appearing anywhere other
than on the same tape with the instructional video, the use would
clearly not have been exempt. 5 The mere fact that Best decided to
append the clips to the instructional video under the guise of a
prefatory statement did not alter its basic form as a commercial
announcement of something unrelated to any exempted use of a
photograph or likeness. Under the reasoning of the dissent, since
the clips were not advertising or announcing a use permitted by
subsection (n)(1), then they could not be exempt under subsection
(n)(4).6
CONCLUSION

In reversing the district court's holding granting summary
judgment for Mrs. Astaire, the Ninth Circuit reviewed California
law of statutory interpretation, analyzing the legislative history and
intent behind § 990. After giving the language of the statute its
plain and ordinary meaning, as required under California law, and
finding nothing in the legislative history to the contrary, the Ninth
Circuit held that Best's use of the Astaire film clips to advertise a
series of instructional dance videos was exempt under § 990(n).

T. Sean Hall

65. Astaire, 116 F.3d at 1304.
66. Id.
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